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Going-Concern Opinions, Auditor
Switching, and the Self-Fulfiiling
Prophecy Effect Examined in the
Regulatory Context of Belgium
ANN VANSTRAELEN*
Previous studies have demonstrated that auditors are reluctant to issue
going-concern opinions. Some suggest this reluctance is strategic and
stems from the auditor's desire to avoid loss of clients or reputation. This
paper investigates the threat of loss re.sulting from auditor switching and
client bankruptcy in the regulatory context of Belgium. Belgium requires
companies to engage an audit firm for a three-year period. Consequently,
the client's threat of .switching auditors is potentially more credible in the
third year than in the first two years.
The empirical results support the hypothesis that going-concern opin-
ions significantly increase the probahility of bankruptcy. Thus, going-
concern reports remain relevant even in a country where debt financing
is dominant. In addition, clients are four times more likely to switch au-
ditors at the end of the mandatory term if they receive a going-concern
opinion in the final year of the term relative to the previous two years.
This .strongly suggests that mandatory terms infiuence the association be-
tween going-concern opinions and auditor switching.
1. Introduction
The auditing literature documents the reluctance by auditors to issue going-
concern opinions (Hopwood et al. [1991]; Citron and Taffler [1992]; Carcello et
al. [1997]). As a possible explanation for the reluctance, research cites strategic
auditor or client behavior (Krishnan and Krishnan 11996]; Matsumuraet al. 11997]).
Essentially, the auditor faces an economic trade-off in deciding to issue a going-
concern opinion. On the one hand, auditors not issuing a going-concern opinion
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face costs of exposure to third-party lawsuits and loss of reputation (Krishnan and
Krishnan 11996]). On the other hand, auditors issuing a going-concern opinion face
costs of loss of clients and/or loss of reputation (Teoh |I992]; Nogler [1995|).
Empirical studies examining the costs of audit loss are limited, especially in the
context of Continental European countries. In my study. I examine the relation
between going-concern opinions and audit loss in a Continental European business
environment, Belgium.
Audit loss can occur when the client switches auditors after Ihe client company
survives the going-concern opinion, or when the client goes bankrupt. My paper
contributes to the literature by examining empirically the impact of a going-concern
opinion both on auditor switching and client bankruptcy and in the regulatory
context of Belgium. Being a Continental European country. Belgium exhibits busi-
ness environment characteristics different from those found in Anglo-American
countries. First, accounting is governed by a legal framework, banks and other
financial institutions play a central role in corporate financing, and tinancial re-
porting is strongly influenced by tax considerations and is creditor-oriented (Le-
febvre and Flower |1994]; BI(x:k and Jorissen [1995]). Second, litigation rates in
Continental Europe are rather low in comparison with the United States and the
United Kingdom (Kinney [1994]; Gietzmann and Quick [1998]). Third, in contrast
to many countries, Belgium exhibits the additional characteristic of an audit man-
date of three years, renewable without limitation, but always for a period of three
years. Tbe renewable audit mandate of three years in Belgium allows me to ex-
amine whether the decision to issue a going-concern opinion early-—versus later
during the mandate—affects auditor switching differently.
I find results consistent with the hypothesis that a going-concern opinion sig-
nificantly increases the likelihood of impending bankruptcy. In addition. I find
companies surviving a going-concern opinion are significantly more likely to switch
auditors in the subsequent year. I also find the effect of a going-concern opinion
on auditor switching only exists when the auditor issues the going-concern opinion
in the last year of the official mandate; a going-concern opinion in the first two
years of the official mandate does not appear to incrementally explain auditor
switching. My results, therefore, suggest mandatory tcniis influence the association
between going-concern opinions and auditor switching and potentially affect au-
ditor independence.
My study contributes to the auditing literature by providing evidence on the
contentious issue of the self-fulfilling prophecy effect, which comes down to the
belief that a client will go bankrupt as a result of a going-concern opinion. In
addition, the results reveal the mitigating role mandatory terms can play in damp-
ening clients" threats to switch auditors when they are dissatisfied with the auditor's
report.
This paper is organized as follows. First. I review the relevant previous liter-
ature. Second. I describe the audit market in Belgium that provides an institutional
framework for interpreting the empirical results of the study. Third, I formulate the
hypotheses. Fourth, I describe the research design. Fifth, I present the results of
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the study. Finally, I discuss the results, draw conclusions, address the limitations
of the study, and give suggestions for further research.
' 2, Previous Literature
A going-concern opinion can trigger the end of an auditor-client relationship.
Audit loss subsequent to the issuance of a going-concern opinion can result from
client bankruptcy or auditor switching.
2.1 Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Effect
The belief that a client will go bankrupt as a result of a going-concern opinion
is known in the literature as the self-fulfilling prophecy effect (Mutchler 11984]).
Mutchler reports, on the basis of interviews, that auditors admit that they take the
potential impact of a going-concern opinion on the client into account. However,
the majority of partners interviewed do not believe in the self-fulfilling prophecy
effect. According to Boritz (1991). the self-fulfilling prophecy effect is a "myth."
The game-theoretic model of Tucker and Matsumura (1998) predicts auditors issue
fewer going-concern opinions when such opinions are self-fulfilling. However, the
experimental results do not confirm the economic prediction. A possible explana-
tion is that auditors exhibit risk aversion and attetTipt to avoid negative payoffs
resulting from reporting errors.
Empirical research on the existence of the self fulfilling prophecy effect finds
conflicting results. No supportive evidence is found by Citron and Taffler (1992),
Louwers et al. (1999), or Citron and Taffler (2001). In contrast, evidence consistent
with the self-fulfilling prophecy effect is provided by George et al. (1996) and
Pryor and Terza (2(X)1). Given the mixed results of prior empirical research, further
research on the self-fulfilling prophecy effect is warranted.
Louwers et al. (1999) sum up some key technical problems of examining the
self-fulfilling prophecy effect: First, it is difficult to disentangle a going-concern
opinion from other indicators of financial distress. Second, evidence that going-
concern opinions are significant in predicting bankruptcy could arise because the
opinion is a self-fulfilling prophecy or because the auditor possesses private infor-
mation that is subsumed in the going-coticern opinion and correctly anticipates
bankruptcy. Third, archival data limit the possibility to fully assess the impact of
a going-concern opinion on a company's future opctations. Indeed, it is impossible
to apply dissimilar treatments to similar companies, nor is it possible to observe
whether a bankrupt company would still be in existence had the auditor decided
against issuing a going concern opinion.
This paper addresses the first two limitations in the following way. First, in
contrast to the study of Louwers et al. (1999), my study includes companies that
either did or did not receive a going-concern opinion. Moreover, other indicators
of financial distress besides the going-concern opinion variable are included in the
bankruptcy-prediction model. This allows me to examine whether a going-concern
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opinion incrementally explains bankruptcy, while controlling for other indicators
of financial distress. Second. 1 test for a correlation between unobserved bankruptcy
determinants and the going-concern opinion variable. The test consists of comput-
ing the generalized residuals of the going-concern opinion variable and including
them as an additional explanatory variable in the bankruptcy model.
2.2 Auditor Switching
Early empirical research uses open-ended questionnaires to infer companies'
reasons for auditor switching. The following reasons are often cited: audit fee.
responsiveness of the auditor to the client, merger and acquisition, rotation policy,
occurrence of management changes, lack of a good working relationship, reporting
disagreements, and financial distress (Fried and Schiff II98I1: DeAngelo 119821;
Eichenseher and Shields [1983]; Menon and Schwartz 11985]: Addams and Davis
[1994]: Schwartz and Soo 11996]).
Empirical research further examines the association between either client or
auditor characteristics and observed auditor selection, or changes in these charac-
teristics and observed auditor changes (Beattie and Fearnley [ 19951). Research find-
ings show that the likelihood of auditor switching is negatively related to the length
of the auditor-client relation.ship (Levintha! and Fichman [1988]), and positively
related to initial public offerings (Menon and Williams Ii99l|). agency conflicts
(DeFond [1992]). and changes in client size (Haskins and Williams [1990]).
The receipt of a qualified opinion appears to Increase the likelihood of auditor
switching (Chow and Rice [1982]; Craswell 11988]; Citron and Taffler 11992];
Krishnan and Stephens [1995]; Lennox [2(X)0]), although this finding is not sup-
ported by Menon and Schwartz (1985). Auditor conservatism, resulting in a ten-
dency to issue qualilied reports, motivates auditor changes as well (Krishnan
[1994]; DeFond and Subramanyam 11998]). The experimental results of Tucker
and Matsumura (1998) suggest clients switch more often if the auditor's going-
concern opinion increases the prospect of business termination. Krishnan et al.
(1996) find that companies with high switch threats are more likely to receive
modified reports. Lennox (2000) provides evidence that auditor switching increases
the likelihood of a change in audit report.
In sum. prior research examining the relationship between auditor reporting
and auditor switching has tested different influences on audit reporting. This paper
examines the association between going-concern opinions and auditor switching in
Belgium where audit firms are engaged for three-year periods. I expect that the
client's threat of switching auditors is more credible in the third year relative to
the first two years.
3. The Audit lMarket in Belgium
Belgian Company Law governs the statutory audit of companies. The General
Meeting of Shareholders appoints the statutory auditor on the recommendation of
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the Board of Directors. All Belgian companies Ihat employ on average more than
one hundred workers have a v '^orks' council. It is a body with parity representation
of employers and employees and it.s purpose is to implement social legislation. The
works' council has the right to refuse the appointment of the nominee auditor and
defend this position in eourt. Auditors are appointed for a term of three years that
is renewable without limitation for further three-year periods. Dismissal of the
auditor during his mandate is only allowed under exceptional circumstances {e.g.
physical incapacity or negligence resulting in a loss of confidence). Likewise, res-
ignation of the auditor during his mandate is restricted, except for serious personal
reasons. The General Meeting has to be informed in writing of the reasons for the
resignation, and the resignation has to be approved by the works" council, if es-
tablished, and for companies under prudential control by the supervisory organ.'
In principle, the audit fee remains fixed during the mandate of three years.
However, the General Meeting of Shareholders is allowed to stipulate an index fee
adjustment. Bree.sch (2(H)I) provides evidence that audit mandates in Belgium are
frequently renewed. Her results suggest the average audit tenure is twenty years
and the resignation rate of Belgian auditors is low.
Auditors in Belgium are subject to a strict code of ethics and auditing stan-
dards. Many of the regulations aim to protect auditor independence (Buijink et al.
11996]). Belgium has a proportional liability system. The client company, share-
holders, and interested third parties can undertake legal action against the auditor
until five years after the issue of the auditor's report. Litigation rates in Belgium
are low. as is typical for countries that have government-prescribed conservative
accounting standards, and where the major providers of capital are banks or the
government (Mueller et al. |I994]).
Belgian audit regulation requires the auditor to ascertain whether the going-
concem assumption is acceptable and to what extent existing going-concern prob-
lems are adequately disclosed in the financial statements. Depending on the
situation. Belgian audit regulation requires the following types of audit reports:
an unqualified report with explanatory paragraph when the going-concern uncer-
tainty has been correctly disclosed in the financial statements'; a qualified opinion
in case of inappropriate information in the financial statements; a disclaimer of
opinion in case of lack of information to evaluate the going-concern status ofthe
company; and an adverse opinion if the going-concern assumption is no longer
appropriate.
1. Banks and insurance companies are under the prudeniial control of the Financial Supervisory
Board. This means thai ihese companies are submitted to .stricter audil regulations. One of the ia.sks of
the Financial Supervisory Board consi.sls ot" the appoinimeni and approval of resignaiion of the statutory
auditor.
2. During the period under study. 1992-1996. the "unqualitied audit opinion with explanatory
paragraph" was not yet recognized by ihe Belgian In.slitute of Auditors. However. 4 out of tiie 1.176
companies in our .sample did receive an unqualilied opinion that mentions going-concem problems.
These four reports are coded as disclosing a going-concem uncenainiy.
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4. Development of Hypotheses
This paper examines whether auditors in Belgium suffer economic loss as a
result of issuing going-concern opinions. Audit loss can result from client bank-
ruptcy or auditor switching. In this respect, I test two hypotheses.
Auditors defend their reluctance to issue a going-concern opinion because they
fear the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. In the words of P. Behets, former chairman
of the Belgian Institute of Auditors: "Every warning could mean the end of the
company und damage all interested parties. When the management of the company
with going-concern problems does not seem to undertake any actions to restore
their financial position, the auditor's decision to issue a going-concern opinion
becomes even more sensitive" (De Fimtncieel Economische Tijd [1996]). The first
hypothesis deals with the impact of a going-concern opinion on the likelihood of
client bankruptcy. The hypothesis formulated in altemative form is as follows:
H,\ Going-concern opinions increase the likelihood of bankruptcy, controlling for
factors that simultaneously influence the likelihood of bankruptcy and the like-
lihood of a going-concern opinion.
The second hypothesis deals with the impact of a going-concern opinion on
the probability of auditor switching when the client .survives. Since auditors in
Belgium are appointed for a minimum and renewable period of three years,
I examine whether the impact of a going-concern opinion in the audit report
issued in the first two years of the audit mandate differs from one issued in the
last year of the audit mandate. The hypothesis formulated in alternative form is as
follows:
H^: Going-concern opinions increase the likelihood of auditor switching more in
the last year of the audit mandate than in the first two years.
5. Research Design
5.1 Sample
The empirical analysis uses data over the period 1992-19% taken from CD-
ROMs of the Belgian National Bank. The CD-ROMs contain the annual accounts
of all Belgian companies that have to publish their financial statements (in general,
all limited liability companies). For each year, three samples are selected. The first
sample is from the population of large companies that went bankrupt.' The bankrupt
sample does not contain financial institution.s, utility companies, or listed firms."
3. The Law on Bookkeeping considers a company to be large if it exceeds more than one of the
following crileHa: (1) average numberof persons employed on annual hasis is fifty; f2)annti:il turnover,
exclusive VAT, €6.250.000: (.1) balance sheet tolal. B.I2.S.000. or whose average number of employees
e.\ceeds one hundred.
4. The lumiber of listed firms in Belgium is low and during the period under study none of the
listed firms went bankrupt.
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The second sample contains financially stressed, non-bankrupt, large companies.
Based on common criteria in the literature (Kida |I98Q]; Mutchler [1985J; Hop-
wood et al. 11994]), I consider a company as financially stressed if it either has a
loss from operations, a bottom line loss, negative retained earnings, or a quick ratio
smaller than one in the previous two years. The third sample is a control sample
and contains financially non-stressed, non-bankrupt, large companies. Menon and
Schwartz (1985) stress the importance of matching control groups by year, industry,
and size. Therefore, the three samples are matched by year, industry (using NACE
codification, 4 digits^), and size (based on total assets). The sample design of this
study is similar to the U.K. study of Citron and Taffler (1992)."
The three samples contain 392 observations each or, in total, 1,176 observa-
tions. The financiai statements, the audit report, and the annual report of the Board
of Directors are collected and examined for each company in the sample. Table I
illustrates the sample proportions and the type of audit report issued. The table
shows that only 37 percent of bankrupt companies receive a going-concern opinion
in the audit report one year prior to bankruptcy.
5.2 Bankruptcy Model
To analyze the impact of a going-concem opinion on the probability of com-
pany failure, 1 distinguish between initial and repeated going-concern opinions. It
could be argued that it is unreasonable to interpret the occurrence of bankruptcy
after several years of repeated going-concern opinions as a self-fulfilling prophecy
(Pryor and Terza [20011). However, if repealed going-concern opinions have no
effect on the probability of bankruptcy, this would weaken the claim that auditors
suffer losses as a result of issuing going-concem opinions. I identify companies
with repeated going-concern opinions by examining the three previous audit reports
of all companies that receive a going-concem opinion.
To estimate the likelihood of bankruptcy after receipt of an initial going-
concern opinion (IGCO) and a repeated going-concem opinion (RGCO). I use
logistic regression analysis. An initial and repeated going-concem opinion are the
two main variables of interest in the bankruptcy model. To control for the fact that
company failure could also have been predicted based on publicly available finan-
cial and non-financial information, I include the following control variables in the
model.
First, I include the financial condition of the firm as a control variable. I
measure the financial condition by the general discriminant score (DSCORE) of a
5. NACE is the abbreviiition of "Nomenctaturi; Gencrale des Activiles Economiqucs dans I' Union
Europ^enne" or "General Name for Economic Activities In the European Union." The NACE-code
system is based on lhe European standard for indusiry ckissilications.
6. The sample design is different from similar research in lhe United States where matched-pairs
sampling often is used: a sample with unqualilied opinions and a sample with modified opinions. This
.sampling approach is nol possible in Belgium since Belgian databases do not allow to search directly
on the type of audit report issued.
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TABLE 1
Sample Proportions and Type of Audit Reports Issued
Audit Report
Unqualified audit report
Disclosure of going-concem
uncertainly:
quahfied opinion
disclaimer of opinion
adverse opinion
No disclosure of going-concern
uncertainty;
qualilicd opinion
disclaimer of opinion
adverse opinion
Sample
Bankrupt Firms
(N = 3q2)
163 (41.6%)
145 (37%)
102 (70%)
35 (24%)
8 (6%)
84 (21.4%)
60(71%)
2i (25%)
3 (4%)
Sample Financially
Stressed. Non-
Bankrupt Firms
(N = 392)
293 (74.8%)
53(13.5%)
49 (92%)
4(8%)
0 (0%)
46(11.7%)
34 (74%)
12 (26%)
0(0%)
Sample Financially Non-
Stres.sed. Non-Bankrupt
Firms (N = 392)
370 (94.4%)
0 (0%)
1
22 (5.6%)
17 (77%)
5 (23%)
0(0%)
Standard bankruptcy prediction model developed for Belgian companies.' I expect
that a lower DSCORE results in a higher likelihood of bankruptcy.
Second. I include the time lag between the closing of the fiscal year and the
submission of the financial statements to the Belgian National Bank as a control
variable. In this respect, I make a distinction between a delay of the annual general
meeting of shareholders (GMDELAY) and a submi.ssion lag (SUBMLAG) of the
financial statements to the Belgian National Bank. Belgian Company Law requires
that the annual general meeting take place within six months after the closing of
the fi.scal year. Companies have to submit the financial .statements to the Belgian
National Bank within thirty days after the annual general meeting of shareholders.
I expect that problem companies delay their annual general meeting and exceed
the required submission time of the financial statements and consequently are more
likely to go bankrupt.
Third. 1 include the location of the company (LOC) as a control variable:
Flanders or Wallonia. National statistics show the bankruptcy ratio, that is. the
number of bankruptcies divided by the number of establishments, is higher in the
southern part of Belgium—Wai Ionia—compared to the northern part—Flanders.
The same applies to the number of bankruptcies divided by the total number of
7. The DSCORE is calculated from Ihe general multiple linear discriminant model, developed for
Belgian companies, consisting of Ihe following ratios: accumulated profit (loss) and reserves/total Ha-
hilitics; taxes and social security charges/short-term external liabilities; cash/reslHcted current assct.s;
work in progres.s and finished goods/restricted current a.ssets; short-iemi financial Uebts/shon-lcmi ex-
ternal liabilities. The optimal cul-off ptiini of DSCORE=0.13()4 (Ooghc. Joos. and de Bourdeaudhuij
[1995]). The bankruptcy models developed in Belgium do not make a distinction between industries
(Ooghe ct al. il995|). It would be beyond Ihe scope of this paper to develop different bankruptcy
models for different industries.
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companies.** Therefore, the probability of bankruptcy of a cotnpany located in Wal-
lonia i.s higher than the probability of bankruptcy in Flanders. An economic expla-
nation for this higher bankruptcy ratio is the structure of the economy in Wallonia,
which is characterized by traditional industries and a weaker demand, resulting in
lower economic growth rate.
Finally, 1 include bad news disclosed in the annual report of the Board of
Directors as a control variable. Belgian Company Law prescribes the type of in-
fortnation the annual report of the Board of Directors must contain. Two statutory
paragraphs are of particular importance for assessing the likelihood of failure,
namely paragraph 2 "important events after the closing of the fiscal year" (PAR2)
and paragraph 3 "circumstances that can influence significantly the development
of the company" (PAR3). Next to these two paragraphs. Belgian Company Law
requires the annual report to di.sclose if Article 103/104 of Belgian Cotiipany Law
(ARTI03/104) that signals financial distress is applicable.'' Finally, the annual re-
port can provide additional information (ADINFO) besides that required by law. I
distinguish three types of news eletnents that could be relevant for the prediction
of bankruptcy: general information on the economic situation, a description of the
prospects of the company, and a description of actions and/or measures that will
be taken. I expect that bad news in the second and third statutory paragraphs,
disclosure that Article 103/104 is applicable, and voluntary disclosure of additional
bad news increases the likelihood of company failure. Table 2 summarizes and
defines the variables used in the bankruptcy model.
Using logistic regression, I estimate the following bankruptcy model:
BANKRUPT, = Po + P, IGCO, + p, RGCO, + P, DSCORE,
+ p, GMDELAY, + p., SUBMLAG, + P, LOC, (i)
+ P, PAR2, + P, PAR3i + Py ADINFO,
Maddala (1991) argues that using a choice-based sample to estimate a logit
model requires no weighting procedure. The coefficients of the explanatory varia-
bles are not affected by the unequal sampling rates, it is only the constant term
that is affected.
8. The bankruptcy raiio. defined as ihe number of bankruptcies divided by the number of cstah-
lishnient.s, is in Wallonia on average 0.28 and in Flandens 0.22 during the period 1991-1996. The
number of bankruptcies divided by the tdttil number of companies follow.s the same pattern, on average
0.020 In Wallonia and 0.017 in Flanders during the period 1991-1996 (calculations based on data
provided by the NIS).
9. Article (103. Alarmprocedure) states: "If net assets are less than 50% of the subscribed capital.
the Board of Directors is required to convene the members of the general meeting, who must decide
on the basis of the Board's reurgani.sation plans whether or not to continue the entity. The diagnosis
has to take into account the specific characteristics of the entity at the closing date of the fiscal year.
as well as events between tliis closing date and the date on which the Board of Directors approves the
annual staiements and submits them to the general meeting." Article (104) states that "if net assets are
below the minimal amount any interested party may appeal to the court to dissolve the company."
TABLE 2
Model Variables and Measurement—Bankruptcy Model
Variables
BANKRUPT.:
Description
Bankrupt company or non-
hankrupt company in year I
Measurement
Di'pendeni:
Binary variahle: BANKRUPT,= 1 in case of
bankrupt company, else BANKRUPT,=O
Independeni:
IGCO,: Iniiial going concern opinion to
client i in year t-l
RGCO,: Repeated going-concern opinion to
chent i in year t-l
DSCORE,: Discriminant score of company i
in year t-1
GMDELAY,: .Submission delay of the annual
accounts of year t-1 of company i
lo the shareholders
SUBMLAG,: Submission lag of the annual ac-
counts of year t-1 of company i to
lhe Belgian National Bank
LOC,: Location of client company in year
t-l: Flanders or Walionia
Information in paragraph 2 of the
annual report of the Board of Di-
rectors in year t-l of company i
"Important Events after the Clcs-
ing of the Fiscal Year"
PAR3,: Information in paragraph 3 of the
annual report of the Board of Di-
rectors in year t-l of compLiny i
"Circumstances That Can Influ-
ence Significantly the Develop-
ment of the Company"
ADINFO,: Additional information given in
the annual report of the Board of
Directors in year t-l of company i:
general infnnnation on the eco-
nomic situation; description of the
prospects for the company; de-
scription of actions, measures ihat
will be taken
ARTI03/IO4,: Application of Article 103/104 of
the Belgian Company Law is dis-
closed in the annual report of the
Board of Directors in year t-l of
company i
Binary variable: IGCO,= I in case of an initial
going-concern opinion, else IGCO|=0
Binary variable; RGCO,= 1 in case of a repeated
going-concem opinion, el.se RGCO,=0
General discritiiinant score (D-.seore) of a stan-
dard bankruptcy model deveioped for Belgian
companies.
The time in months between the balance sheei
date and the dale of the annual general meeting.
The time in days between the date of the annual
general meeting and the submission date of the
annual accounts and audit report to the Belgian
National Bank.
Binary vuriable: LOC, - I in case company is
located in Wailonia, LOC, = 0 in case company
is kK-ated in Flanders
Binary variable: PAR2,= 1 in ca.se itnportant
events after the closing of the fiscal year have
occurred and are disclosed in the annual report
of the Board of Directors, else PAR2,=()
Binary variable; PAR3,= I in case the annual
report of the Board of Directors describes cir-
cumstances thai can influence significantly the
development of the company, else PAR3,=0
Ordinal variable: ADINFO| = 0 in case no addi-
tional bad news or good news is disclosed; AD-
INFO,= 1. 2. or 3 in case bud news is disclosed
on one, two, ihree information elemenis. respec-
tively.
In case of a mixture of good and bad news ele-
ments, only the bad news elements count for
ctKJing the ADINFO,>0.
Binary variable; ART1O3/1O4,= I in case the ap-
plication of the Ariicle(s) is disclosed, else
ART 103/104=0
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5.3 Switching Model
For the second research hypothesis, the sample of bankt^pt companies cannot
be used since Ihc decision to switch auditors is no longer relevant. Therefore, the
analyses are done on tbe samples of financially stressed and nun-strcsscd surviving
companies. Botb samples contain 392 observations eacb. so the total number of
observations is 784. Data on tbe bistory and length of tbe auditor-client relationship
are retrieved from the CD-ROMs of the Belgian National Bank. For eacb obser-
vation, tbe following information is collected: tbe start of tbe auditor-client reia-
tionsbip; number of renewals of the audit mandate: and the end of tbe last audit
mandate when tbe client switches auditors. Given the audit mandate of tbree years,
audit firm switch data are analyzed over a period of three years following the audit
report. For example, if tbe audit report of company X was issued in 1994 (year t),
tben it is cbecked whetber company X switcbes auditors in 1995 (year t + 1),
1996 (year t + 2), or 1997 (year t + 3). In tolal. 9.31% (-73/784) of the companies
switcb auditors. Table 3 summarizes and defines the dependent and independent
variables.
The dependent binary variable is "SWITCH," coded I if a company switcbes
auditors in tbe next mandate period (year t + I. year t + 2, or year t + 3, depending
on wbetber the year of tbe examined audit report was respectively the last, second.
or first year of tbe audit mandate) or coded 0 in tbe case of no switch. Tbe inde-
pendent variables of interest are going-concern opinions in the first, second, or last
year of tbe incumbent auditor's official mandate. A distinction is also made between
initial and repeated going-concem opinions, since initial going-concern opinions
may have a bigger impact on auditor switching. Tbis results in the following six
variables: initial going-concem opinion in tbe first (IGCOYI). second (IGC0Y2),
or final year (IGC0Y3) of the auditor's mandate and repeated going-concem opin-
ion in the first (RGCOYl). second (RGC0Y2), or final year (RGCOY3).
To reduce the likelihood of correlated omitted variables, I include tbree control
variables in the model that can affect the auditor switch decision.'" First, a switcb
of auditor can reflect financial distress (Menon and Schwartz 11985|). I measure
financial distress by tbe general discriminant score (DSCORE) of a standard bank-
ruptcy prediction model developed for Belgian companies.
Second, most auditor switching studies include an auditor size variable. Big 6
auditor or non-Big 6 auditor (B6) (Krisbnan [1994])." Tbe B6 variable is coded
I if tbe incutnbcnt (potentially outgoing) auditor is a Big 6 firm. 1 posit no direction
for the B6 variable. On the one hand, the B6 variable represents both audit quality
and auditor reputation, wbicb would result in a negative sign (Krisbnan et al.
11996]). On tbe other hand, searching for a more flexible auditor is easier if you
10. This paper does not focus on situational or contextual variables that may influence auditor
switching.
f 1. My sample relates to the period 1992-1996. During this period there were still six Big audit
linns.
2421 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING. AUDITING & FINANCE
TABLE 3
I
Model Variables and Measurement—Auditor Switching Model
Variables De.scripiion Measurement
Dependent:
SWITCH, Company i swiiched lo a new audit Binary variable SW1TCH,= 1 in case of auditor
firm in the next period (year i+ 1, switch, else SW1TCH,=O
t + 2. or t+3)
hiiiependeni:
Binary variable: IGCOY1,= 1 in case of an initial
going-concem opinion in the first year of the au-
ditor's nflicial mandate, else 1GCOYI|=0
Binary variable: IGCOY2,= I in i.a.se of an initial
going-concem opinion in the second year of the
auditor's oflicial mandate, else IGCOY2,=0
Binary variable: IGC0Y3,= I in case of an initial
going-concern opinion in the last year of the au-
ditor's ofticial mandate, else 1GCOY3,=0
Binary variable: ROCOY1,= 1 in case of a re-
peated going-concem opinion in the first year of
the auditor's official mandate, else RGCOYI,=0
Binary variable: RGC0Y2i= I in case of a re-
peated going-concem opinion in the second year
of the auditor's oflicial mandate, else
RGCOY2,=0
Binary variable: RGC0Y3,= I in case of a re-
peated going-concem opinion in the la.st year of
the auditors oflicial mandaic. el.se RGCOY3,=0
General di.scriminant score (D-score) of Ooghe
& Vobaere's bankruptcy model developed for
Belgian companies.
Binary variable: B6,= 1 in case of a Big 6 audi-
tor, else B6,=()
Natural logarithm of total assets in year t
currently have a conservative auditor. Big 6 auditors tend to be more conservative
given their larger liability exposure. Moreover, large auditors are more likely to
resign because they face greater econotnic threats from litigation and/or reputation
loss.'- This would result in a positive sign.
IGCOYl,:
IGC0Y2,:
IGC0Y3,:
RGCOYI,:
RGC0Y2,:
RGCOY3,:
DSCORE,:
LN ASSETS,:
Initial going-concem opinion re-
ceived in year t by an auditor in
the first year of his official man-
date.
Initial going-concem opinion re-
ceived in year t by an auditor in
the second year of his official man-
date.
Initial going-concem opinion re-
ceived in year i by an auditor in
the last year of his official man-
date.
Repeated going-concem opinion
received in year 1 by an auditor in
the first year of his official man-
date.
Repeated going-concem opinion
received in year t by an auditor in
the second year of his official man-
date.
Repeated going-concem opinion
received in year t by an auditor in
the last year of his official man-
date.
Financial condition of the com-
pany. Discriminant score of com-
pany i in year t
Company i has a Big 6 auditor or
a non-Big 6 auditor in year t
Client size
low.
12. It is noted though that Breesch (2001) suggests the resignation rate of Belgian auditors is
GOING-CONCERN OPINIONS 243
Third, auditor switching could be affected by client size. Some auditor switch-
ing studies find a negative relationship between auditor switching and size (Haskins
and Williams [1990]; Krishnan [1994]). Smaller companies tend to move to large
auditors as they grow and their needs change. For large companies, auditor switch-
ing is more costly (Williams 11988]). Moreover, fewer audit firms exist that can
handle large companies since they are often geographically dispersed and involve
complex transactions. I measure client size by the natural logarithm of total assets
(LNASSETS).
Using logistic regression analysis. I estimate the following auditor switching
model;
SWITCH, = Po + P, IGCOYl, + P, IGC0Y2i + P, IGC0Y3i
+ p4 RGCOYl, + % RGCOY2, 4- p,, RGC0Y3, (2)
+ p, DSCORE^ + p« Bt, + p.j LNASSETSi + e,
6. Results
6.1 Bankruptcy Model
The three samples (bankrupt; financially stressed, non-bankrupt; and financially
non-stressed, non-bankrupt) contain 392 observations each, or in total 1.176 com-
panies. Of these 1.176 companies. 198 companies (17%) receive a going-concern
opinion. Of these 198 companies, only 53 (27%) survive the first year. The three
previous audit reports of the 198 companies are examined to identify companies
with initial going-concern opinion.s. Of these 198 companies, 76 companies
(38.4%) receive a going-concern opinion for the first time. Of these 76 companies,
only 27 companies (35.5%) survive the following year. Ofthe 122 companies with
a repeated going-concem opinion, only 26 companies (21.3%) survive the subse-
quent year.
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables and Table 5
presents the Pearson correlation matrix. Table 4 .shows that, in comparison with
non-bankrupt firms, companies one year prior to bankruptcy have significantly
lower D-scores and significantly delay the annual general meetings and the sub-
mission of financial statements. Most companies are located in Flanders, but the
presence of Walloon companies is significantly higher in the smnple of bankmpt
companies. Finally, soon-to-be bankrupt firms disclose significantly more bad news
in their annual reports.
The results of the bankruptcy model can only be used to assess the impact of
a going-concem opinion on the probability of bankruptcy if the going-concem
opinion variable is exogenous {Pryor and Terza |2{K)I|). Therefore, it is checked
whether the going-concem opinion variables are correlated with the regression error
term, resulting in biased regression estimates (Greene 120001). To test for endo-
geneity bias, the following procedure is followed. First, I estimate the going-
concem opinion model to compute the generalized residuals of the going-concem
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics—Bankruptcy Model
Variables
Bankrupt Companies
(N = 392)
Nnn-Bankrupl Companies Pearson x~
{H = 784) (/j-va!ue*}
IGCO
RGCO
LOC
PAR2
PAR3
ADINFO
ART 103/104
IGCO: 12.8%
No IGCO: 87.2%
RGCO: 24.5%
No RGCO: 75.5%
Flanders: 65.1%
Walionia: 34.9%
Info.: 17.1%
No info.: 82.9%
Info.: 5.2%
No info.: 94.8%
No info.: 35.5%
Adinfo = 1: 34.5%
Adinfo - 2: 20.6%
Adinfo = 3: 9.4%
Info.: 23.7%
No info.: 76.3%
lGCO: 3.4%
No IGCO: 96.6%
RGCO: 3.3%
No RGCO: 96.7%
Flanders: 71.0%
Waltonia: 29.0%
Info.: 5.7%
No info.: 94.3%
Info.: 2.1%
No info.: 97.9%
No info.: 58.3%
Adinfo = 1: 29.6%
Adinfo = 2: 10.2%
Adinfo = 3: 1.9%
Info.: 8.5%
No info.: 91.5%
37.028
(0.000)
126.007
(0.000)
4.395
(0.036)
28.860
(O.OOt))
6.294
(0.012)
60.70«
(0.000)
37.829
(0.000)
Variables
Bankrupt Companies
Mean Rank (Sum of
Rank.s)
Non-Bankrupl Companies
Mean Rank (Sum of
Ranks)
Mann-Whitney U
(/?-value*)
DSCORE
GMDELAY
SUBMLAG
373.41
(146.377)
2.*ilh perceniile: -1 .68
median: -0 .59
75th pereenlile: 0.07
679.57
(266391)
25th pcreenlile: 5
median: 6
75th pereenlile: 6
623.21
(244298)
25lh pereenlile: 22
median: 33
75lh percentile: 69.50
*One-iailed test.
Variable
IGCO
RGCO
LOC
PAR2
definitions:
= initial going-eoneem opinion
= repealed going-concem opinion
696.04
(54.5699)
25lh percentile: -0 .21
median: 0.58
75th perceniile: 1.59
542.96
(425684)
25th percentile: 5
median: 5
75th percentile: 6
571.15
(447778)
25th percentile: 22
median: 30
75lh perceniile: 48
= l(K-ation of clieni eompany in Wailonia
- informalion in naracranli 2 "InnDortant Events after the Closini
69349
(0.000)
117964
(0.000)
140058
(0.006)
' of the Fisca
the annual repon of lhe Board of Directors
PAR3 = informalion in paragraph 3 "Circumstances Thai Can Influence Significantly the De-
veiopmcnl of the Company" of the annual report of the Board of Directors
ADINFO = additional information (general information on the economic situation, description of
the priwpecls of lhe company, description of actions and/or measures ihal will be taken)
in the annual report of lhe Board of Directors
ART1O3/IO4 = application of Article 103/104 of Belgian Company Law is diselosed in the annual
repon (tf the Board of Directors
DSCORE = general discriminant score
GMDKLAY = delay of the annual general meeting of shareholders
SUBMLAG = submission lag of the linanelal statements lo the Belgian National Bank
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opinion variable (Gourieroux et al. [1987]).'''"' Subsequently, ! include these gen-
eralized residuals as an additional explanatory variable in the bankruptcy model. If
the coefficient of the residuals is significant, the going-concern opinion variables
are endogenou.s. In unreported results, I find the coefficient of the residual variable
insignificant (p=().872), so the hyptithesis of no endogeneity bias cannot be re-
jected. Hence, the bankruptcy model can he used to assess the impact of a going-
concem opinion on the probability of bankruptcy.
As can be seen from Table 6, the coefficients of both the initial and repeated
going-concern opinion variables are significant (p<O.OI). This is consistent with
the hypothesis that a going-concem opinion significantly increases the probability
of bankmptcy. Table 6 further shows that the following variables significantly
increase the likelihood of bankruptcy: bad financial condition, a delay ofthe annual
general meeting of shareholders, a delay of the submission of the financial state-
ments, location in an economically weaker region, important post year-end events,
and additional bad news disclosed in the annual report of the Board of Directors."*
6.2 Switching Model
The samples of financially stressed, non-bankrupt and financially non-stressed,
non-bankrupt companies contain 392 cases each or, in total, 784 companies, of
which 73 companies (9.31%) switched auditors.
Table 7 presents the results of the univariate analysis. The Pearson correlation
matrix Is presented in Table 8. Table 9 presents the logistic regression results.
The results of both the univariate and logistic regression analysis show auditor
switching is related to the year of mandatory term in which a going-concem opinion
is given. In particular, companies switch auditors significantly more when they
have received an initial or repeated going-concern opinion in the last year of the
auditor's official mandate. An initial or repeated going-concem opinion in the first
or second year does not result in a higher likelihood of auditor switching."' This
13. The model for going-concern opinions is specitied wilh the rollowiiig independent variables:
financial conditiiin. delay of [he annuai general meeting, submission lag ol" the annual aeL-oiint.s. localiun
of the client company, auditor type, audilor switch, length of the auditor-client reiationship, year of
auditor mandate, audit fee. recent client loss, and had news in the annual report of Ihe Board of
Directors.
14. The generalized residuals are derived from the first order conditions that define the maximum
likelihood estimates and are calctjlated as follows:
15. Company .size (measured by natural logarithm of total assets) has no significant multivariate
effect on bankruptcy.
16. A univariate analysis of auditor's reporting behavior shows that auditors issue less initial
though signilicantly more repeated going-concem opinions in the last year of their mandate as opposed
to the first two years. When tested in a multivariate way. there are no significant differences in auditor
reporting behavior beiween the three years of the mandate, either for an initial or for a repeated going-
concem opinion.
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TABLE 6
Logistic Regression Results—Bankruptcy Model
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Variables
CONSTANT
IGCO
RGCO
DSCORE
GMDELAY
SUBMLAG
LOC
PAR2
PAR?
ARTI(B/104
ADINFO
- 2 * log likeli-
hood
Pscudo-R-
Prcditted Sign
-(-
+
-
+
+
+
+
-(-
Dependent Variable = I for bankrupt companies and 0 for non-bankrupl companies (N = 865)
Parameter Eslimaie p-value
- 2 . 7 6 5 0.000***
1.016 0.001***
1.753 O.(HX>***
- 0 . 2 3 9 O.()(X)***
0.198 0.005***
0.004 0.028**
0.328 0.072*
0.752 0.009***
0.454 0.331
- 0 . 1 8 0 0.503
0.401 0.000***
864.593 0.000""*
0.213
*•* = /7-value < 0,01.
** =/7-value < 0.05.
* = p-value < 0.1.
Variable definitions: •
IGCO - initiiil going-concem opinion
RGCO - repeated going-concem opinion
DSCORE = genera! discriininani .score
GMDELAY - delay of (he annual general meeting of shareholders
SUBMLAG = subnii.ssion lag of the financial siaiemenis to the Belgian National Bank
LOC = location of client company in Wailonia
PAR2 = informalion in paragraph 2 important Events after the Closing of the Fiscal Year" of
the annual report of the Board cif Directors
PAR3 = information in paragraph 3 "Circum.stances That Can Influence Significantly the De-
velopment of the Company" of the annual report of the Board of Directors
ART103/104 = application of Article 103/104 of Belgian Company Law is disclosed in the annual
report of the Board of Directors
ADINFO = additional information (general information on Ihe economic situation, description of
the prospects of the company, description of actions and/or measures that will be taken)
in the annual report of the Board of Directors
is also illustrated in Figure I. This finding suggests clients apply greater pressure
in the Hnal year of their mandate and are not able to tnount a credible threat in
earlier years. For the control variables, I find no significant differences between
companies that switch auditors and companies that do not switch."
17. It is noted that there is no multivariate effect of change in client size and change in financial
condition on auditor switching.
TABLE 7
Descriptive Statistics—Auditor Switching Model
Variables
IGCOYl
1GC0Y2
lGCOY.l
RGCOYI
RGC0Y2
RGCOY3
B6
Variables
DSCORE
LNASSETS
SWITCH (N = 73)
IGCOYl: 1.4%
No IGCOYl: m.b%
IGC0Y2: 0%
No IGC0Y2: 100%
IGC0Y3: 2.7%
No 1GC0Y3: 97.3%
RGCOY1: 0%
No RGCOYI: 100%
RGCOY2: 0%
No RGCOY2: 100%
RGCOY3: 5.5%
No RGCOY3: 94.5%
B6: 29.2%'
NB6: 70.8%
SWITCH (N = 73)
Mean Rank
(Sum of Ranks)
372.82
(27215.5)
25th percentile: -0.41
median: 0.50
75[h percentile: 1.50
412.96
(30146)
25th percentile: 11.1
median: 12.1
75th percentile: 12.6
NO SWITCH (N = 711)
IGCOYl: 2.8%
No IGCOYl: 97.2%
1GC0Y2: 0.7%
No IGC0Y2: 99.3%
IGC0Y3: 1%
No IGC0Y3: 99%
RGCOYI: 1.1%
No RGCOYI: 98.9%
RGC0Y2: 1.1%
No RGCOY2: 98.9%
RGCOY3: 0.8%
No RGC0Y3: 99.2%
B6: 29.2%
NB6: 70.8%
NO SWITCH (N = 711)
Mean Rank
(Sum of Ranks)
394.52
(280504.5)
25th percenlile: -0.18
median: 0.62
75th percentile: 1.61
390.40
(277574)
25lh percentile: I I I
median: 11.9
75th percentile: 12.6
Pearson x'
(/j-value*)
0.529
(0.467)
0.517
(0.236)
1.797
(0.09)
0.830
(0.181)
0.830
(0.I8I)
11.297
(0.0005)
O.IK)O
(0.50)
Mann Whitney U
(;>-value*)
24514.5
(0.217)
2*08
(0.209)
*One-tailed test.
Variable definitions:
IGCOYI = initial going-concem opinion in first year of auditor's mandate
1GCOY2 = initial going concern opinion in second year of auditor's mandate
IGC0Y3 = initial going-concern opinion in third year of auditor's mandate
RGCOYI = repeated going-concem opinion in first year of audiior's mandate
RGC0Y2 = repeated going-concem opinion in second year of auditor's mandate
RGC0Y3 = repeated going concem opinion in third year of auditor's mandate
B6 = Big 6 auditor (coded I) or a non-Big 6 auditor
DSCORE = general discriminani score
LNASSETS = natural logarithm of toial assets
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TABLE 9
Logistic Regression Results—Auditor Switching Model
Dependenl Variable = 1 for companies that switched auditors and 0 for cotnpanies that did not
switch auditors (N = 784)
Variables Predicted Sign Parameler Estimate J-value
CONSTANT
IGCOYI
IGCOY2
1GC0Y3
RGCOYI
RGCOY2
RGCOY3
DSCORE
B6
LNASSETS
- 2 * log likelihood
Pseudo-R-
-2.909
0.016
-5.673
2.127
-3.678
-5.659
2.597
0.043
0.007
0.042
4.'i4.202
0.045
0.014«*
0,988
0.8.33
0.001***
0.790
0.790
0.000***
0.503
0,982
0.672
0.003
/ O.OI.
**= ;>-value < 0.05.
*= p-vaiue < 0.1.
Variable definitions:
IGCOY1 = initial going-concem opinion in lirst year of auditor's mandate
IGCOY2 = initial going-concem opinion in second year of auditor's mandate
IGC0Y3 = initial going-concem opinion in ihird year of auditor's mandate
RGCOY 1 = repeated going-concem opinion in tirst year of audilor's mandate
RGC0Y2 = repeated going-concem opinion in second year of auditor's mandate
RGC0Y3 = repeated going-concem opinion in third year of auditor's mandate
DSCORE = general discriminani score
B6 = Big 6 auditor (ctuied I) or a non—Big 6 auditor
LNASSETS = natural logarithm of total assets
7. Discussion and Conclnsions
This paper investigates the impact of a going-concern opinion on audit loss
resuhing from client bankruptcy or auditor switching. The results of the empirical
analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that both initial and repeated going-
concern opinions increase the likelihood of impending bankruptcy. This finding
suggests the audit report has informational value for the users of the financiai
statements, even in a country where corporate financing is dominated by banks and
other financial institutions."*
18. An altemative methixl for le,sting the infonnation content of audit opinions is an event study
approach. Given the small number of Belgian companies that are listed and the fact thai no listed firm
went banknipi in the period under study (1992-1996). it was nol possible to examine the market reaction
to going-concem disclosure announcements.
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FIGURE 1
Auditor Switching and Going-Concern Opinions
D Switch
• No switch
Initial or repeated GCO Initial or repeated GCO Initial or repeated GCO
in first year of auditor in second year of in iast year of auditor
mandate auditor mandate mandate
This paper addresses key technical problems of examining the self-fulfilling
prophecy effect but is subject to several caveats. Although 1 control for a correlation
between unobserved bankruptcy determinants and going-concern opinions and I
control for most publicly observable indicators of distress. I cannot eliminate the
omitted variable problem (e.g., 1 do not control for press coverage). Moreover, it
is not possible to determine what would have happened to firms that received
going-concem opinions had they not received them. Nor is it possible to randomly
select firms that will receive a going-concem opinion in a controlled environment
(Citron and Taffler [1992]).
My results provide further evidence that companies surviving a going-concem
opinion are significantly more likely to switch auditors in the subsequent year. This
finding is consistent with the results of Lennox (2000), In addition. 1 find that the
effect of both initial and repeated going-concem opinions on auditor switching only
occurs when going-concern opinions are given in the last year of official audit
mandates. Indeed, clients are more than four times as likely to switch auditors at
the end of the mandatory term if they receive a going-concern opinion in the final
year, compared to any other year. This suggests the regulatory mandate of three
years affects the way clients pressure auditors with a loss of future audit fees. A
limitation of this study is that no distinction is made between auditor resignations
and auditor dismissals, Belgian Company Law does not require companies to dis-
close the initiating party to an auditor change and in practice it is not disclosed.
However, there is evidence that the resignation rate of auditors in Belgium is low
(Breesch |2001|).
Finally, 1 analyze the impact of a going-concern opinion on the probability of
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bankruptcy and on the probability of audit(jr switching. Further research can in-
vestigate the impact of a going-concern opinion on other events (e.g., merger,
voluntary liquidation) or on the auditor's reputation. The analysis of the economic
effects and effectiveness of different national regulations on auditor independence
presents another avenue of future research.
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